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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-4342 
___________ 
 
GABRIEL PITTMAN, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
JAMES B. MARTIN, ESQ.; 
DOUGLAS REICHLEY, ESQ.; 
STEVEN M. LUKSA, ESQ., ET AL 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 5-13-cv-05632) 
District Judge:  Honorable Joel H. Slomsky  
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
April 24, 2014 
Before:  SMITH, HARDIMAN and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 17, 2014) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
 Pro se litigant Gabriel Pittman appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his 
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) with prejudice.  We have jurisdiction under 28 
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U.S.C. § 1291, and we exercise plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal order.  
See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  For the reasons set forth 
below, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 Pittman initiated this action by filing a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the 
District Court.  In the complaint, he alleged that he has been unlawfully imprisoned 
because the criminal information against him was wrongfully amended in 1998 
proceedings in the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas.  He named as defendants the 
Lehigh County District Attorney; the Lehigh County District Attorney’s Office; the 
Lehigh County Public Defender’s Office; Lehigh County; the Lehigh County Court of 
Common Pleas; two assistant district attorneys; four defense attorneys; two judges of the 
Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas; and a judge of the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  Pittman requested $100 million in 
compensatory damages and $100 million in punitive damages from each defendant, plus 
fees and costs.  He further requested a declaratory judgment acknowledging that he was 
wrongfully imprisoned.  Pittman also moved to amend his complaint to include several 
state-law claims. 
 The District Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, citing the immunity of 
all defendants from Pittman’s § 1983 claims.  Pittman then filed a timely notice of appeal 
to this Court. 
 The District Court’s disposition of this case was correct.  Judges are generally 
immune from suits for money damages.  Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991).  If the 
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actions underlying the complaint were judicial and were not performed “in the complete 
absence of all jurisdiction,” then this immunity is absolute, regardless of whether the 
judicial acts were malicious, corrupt, or wrong.  Id. at 11-13.  The judges’ acts to which 
Pittman points — permitting the amendment of criminal information, sentencing a 
defendant, and dismissing motions and petitions — are prototypical judicial acts, inherent 
to the process of adjudication.  See, e.g., Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d 246, 255, 257 
(6th Cir. 1997) (acts of adjudication, including the rendering of judgments and orders, are 
judicial acts); Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 443 (3d Cir. 2000) (ordering a 
defendant to prison is a paradigm judicial act); Johnson v. Kegans, 870 F.2d 992, 997 
(5th Cir. 1989) (sentencing is a judicial act).  The record does not demonstrate that these 
acts were performed in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.  The judges are thus 
immune to Pittman’s § 1983 claims for damages.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 Likewise, prosecutors acting within the scope of their duties in initiating and 
pursuing a criminal prosecution are immune to suit under § 1983.  Imbler v. Pachtman, 
424 U.S. 409, 410 (1976).  The acts of which Pittman complains vis-à-vis the prosecutors 
– namely, that they amended the criminal information and prosecuted the case against 
him – fit squarely within the realm of official prosecutorial duties.  See id. at 430 
(activities intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process, casting 
the prosecutor as an advocate rather than an administrative or investigative officer, 
trigger absolute immunity).  The prosecutor defendants therefore enjoy immunity from § 
1983 liability for those acts. 
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 Pittman’s § 1983 claims against the defense attorneys are also unavailing.  Public 
defenders do not act under color of law when performing the traditional functions of 
counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.  Consequently, they cannot be sued for 
such actions under § 1983.  Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981).  While they 
could nonetheless be liable under § 1983 if they conspired with a state actor to deprive 
Pittman of federal rights — see Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 916 (1984) — Pittman 
has presented only conclusory allegations of conspiracy, which are insufficient from a 
pleading perspective.  See Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 
F.3d 159, 178-79 (3d Cir. 2010) (conclusory allegations of an agreement do not meet the 
pleading standards; instead, specific facts addressing the time the agreement was made, 
the period of the conspiracy, the exact parties to the agreement, and the object of the 
conspiracy are required).  Because Pittman failed to plead conspiracy with the necessary 
particularity, his claim cannot support liability for the defense attorney defendants under 
§ 1983. 
 Pittman’s claims against the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas are equally 
ineffective, because the Eleventh Amendment shields it from liability to suits brought in 
federal court.  See Benn v. First Judicial Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 235 n.1, 241 (3d Cir. 
2005).  Similarly, his claims against Lehigh County cannot stand.  A municipality may be 
sued under § 1983 only when its execution of a government policy or custom injures the 
plaintiff.  See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).  Beyond the 
occasional and bare recitation of the words “custom and/or policy,” the complaint failed 
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to allege governmental action on anyone other than Pittman.  Because this demonstrates 
neither custom nor policy on the part of Lehigh County, his § 1983 claim against it fails.  
Cf. id. (New York City Board of Education policy compelling all pregnant employees to 
take unpaid leaves of absence before they were medically required constitutes a custom 
or policy that could trigger liability under § 1983). 
 In addition to his claims as to each defendant, Pittman seems to make a general 
claim of wrongful imprisonment.  To the extent that Pittman seeks money damages for 
that claim, it is barred by the immunity each defendant enjoys.  And to the extent that 
Pittman seeks equitable relief affecting his continued incarceration, he has no claim under 
§ 1983.  See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (“[W]hen a state prisoner is 
challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks 
is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that 
imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” (emphasis added)).   
 Lastly, Pittman moved to amend his complaint to include various state-law claims 
for the same underlying acts.  We interpret the District Court’s silence on the state-law 
claims in its opinion to mean that it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 
them.  Given the fate of Pittman’s § 1983 claims discussed above, declining to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction was not error.  See 28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(3). 
 Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order dismissing 
Pittman’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  
